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ABSTRACT 
 
According to Morningstar companies with certain structural characteristics enjoy economic moats. 
Compared to benchmark indices, Morningstar hypothesizes that over a ten-year time frame these 
firms will evidence superior price appreciation. Based on analysis of 1360 companies, this study 
supports the thesis of historical performance among wide-moat firms. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n economic moat is a sustainable competitive advantage. Companies with a wide economic moat can 
repel competitors intent on raiding the market and contain those already present. A longtime 
champion of this concept, Warren Buffet scours for businesses that have “economic castles protected 
by unbreachable moats” (Morningstar, 2004, p. 10). Morningstar has also advanced this notion, arguing that such 
firms will generate superior shareholder value over the long-term (Larson, 2004). While such an assertion appears 
plausible, it has not been subjected to extensive empirical analysis. The purpose of this study is to gauge the 
longitudinal validity of Morningstar’s claim.  Specifically, do these structural characteristics represent advantages that 
lead to price appreciation? 
 
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WIDE-MOAT FIRMS 
 
Morningstar (Sellers, 2003) has delineated four essential criteria that characterize wide-moat firms.  In 
formulating its typology, Morningstar has drawn heavily on Michael Porter’s (1980) precepts for competitive strategy. 
 
Economies Of Scale 
 
Some companies can build sustainable competitive advantage by scaling infrastructure. These firms can 
thrive as a low-cost provider even after their products have become commodities. With its direct sales of hardware, 
Dell Computer stands as a classic example. As the world’s largest retailer with 5000 stores around the globe, Walmart 
can create similar pricing pressure for actual and potential competitors. 
 
High Customer-Switching Costs 
 
High barriers to entry deter encroachment. A firm can then cement its client base and induce customer 
“stickiness.” Orthopedic surgeons, for example, prefer proprietary products with documented clinical histories.  Aging 
but still active “baby boomers” assure a continuous patient base for doctors using the wares of Zimmer and Stryker. 
 
Intangible Assets 
 
Intellectual property protects firms from the clonal crowd. Patents afford protection whether the estate is 
cellphone chips or pharma product. For example, the bulk of Qualcomm’s profits stem from patent royalties and 
CDMA chip sales. The company’s net has surged an average of 92 percent over the past three years. Pfizer sells 14 of 
the world’s top 25 medicines and seeks to maintain cash flow through authorized generics once those patents expire. 
Government permits can also bestow competitive benefit. A graying demographic will spur demand for Stericycle’s 
medical waste services. Hospitals and clinics retain liability for waste even after it has been removed from their 
premises. Hence medical institutions gravitate toward providers whose treatment facilities have passed government 
A 
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muster. Another company with a distinctive government designation is Moody’s. It claims the coveted certification of 
“nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 
 
Network Economics 
 
Trusted exchange mediums create a cascading conduit between buyers and sellers. Examples abound across 
sectors. AMEX credit cards project an ambiance of both exclusivity and efficiency. Software protocols such as 
Adobe’s reader allow and augment communication. The free version of Acrobat has been downloaded 500 million 
times and is considered the de facto standard in document exchange. Morningstar sees eBay as the textbook example 
of the network effect. As this virtual community culls buyers and sellers, it becomes ever more enticing to prospective 
users. 
 
MOAT METRICS 
 
Appearing in Europe during the 1100s, large stone castles existed for nearly four centuries. Their purpose 
was to protect the realm for the king since a feudal lord was vassal to the king. A second function was to preserve the 
lord’s own provincial power. Moats served as the first line in a castle’s defense, reaching their apex in the thirteenth 
century. Behind the moat were more layered barriers, including a drawbridge, a gatehouse whose portcullis could be 
lowered, and a keep or great tower that stood as the final refuge during siege. This self-sufficient fortified tower 
functioned as the castle’s main citadel. The round keep at Pembroke Castle, for example, measured 80 feet in height, 
contained four stories, and had walls 16 feet thick. When selecting stocks, Buffet prefers Great Danes to Chihuahuas 
(Schraeder, 2005b). If companies do not have a solid and substantive core business, they are “terminally ugly” (Mann, 
2005, p. 10) and even a great manager cannot rescue them from their inherent shortcomings. Both Morningstar and 
Buffet would presumably warn investors to be wary of castles that seem splendid on the surface yet lack defenses to 
protect their pulchritude. Any success they enjoy will be ephemeral rather than enduring. 
 
Although Morningstar does not pursue the implications of its historical analogy, presumably multiple moats 
would further fortify defenses. In gauging competitive strategy, analysts have observed that “where there is drift, there 
is risk” (Lehl & Alexander, 2005). Multiple moat companies, however, can retain focus on core product even as they 
cater to diverse end markets. Such a company’s clients might come from government as well as business.  Deeply 
entrenched firms might also leverage core expertise through different but related products. Japanese castles often 
utilized multiple moats to deter and destroy invaders. This water model has an analogue in the wall formation of so-
called concentric castles where the first wall was lower than the second. Castle defenders could aim weaponry at the 
advancing army without inflicting harm on fellow defenders stationed below. 
 
In its search of the stock universe, Morningstar has accorded the wide-moat designation sparingly (Sellers, 
2004).  Only 154 large-caps qualify for such status. These companies resemble those castles whose moats could be as 
much as 30 feet deep and 12 feet wide. Some of those moats even contained submerged and sharpened wooden 
“bungy sticks” to impale attackers. 
 
Morningstar has also produced a roster of 754 narrow moat companies. Endowed with a distinctive 
advantage, these companies provide shelter from the storm but by no means are they impregnable. In contrast, wide-
moat firms possess more than one of the four competitive advantages underpinning the Morningstar typology 
(Schrader, 2005a). 
 
Most equities enjoy no real moat according to Morningstar. In historical terms these firms are reminiscent of 
those castles situated where water moats were impractical. Dry ditches were much more common than water-filled 
perimeters and so it is with equities today. 
 
STUDY HYPOTHESIS 
 
Morningstar avers that over time wide moat companies create economic value for shareholders (Figure 1).  
Since these companies will outperform, they should be buy and hold selections. If investors “avoid the flash” and stay 
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the course, they will “find the cash” with Morningstar’s list. The purpose of this study is to test Morningstar’s 
assertion.  A pilot survey last year lent some credence to the hypothesis (Boyd, 2005). The present study, however, 
examines the entire set of wide moat and narrow moat companies. It tracks longitudinal price appreciation and 
compares stock performance to the S&P benchmark (SPX). Morningstar hypothesizes that after only five years, wide 
moat status will not be persistently and persuasively associated with price appreciation. Instead Morningstar advocates 
ten years as a minimal baseline, citing Stein’s (Stein & DeMuth, 2003) conclusion that value conscious investors 
require such a period of time to generate substantial excess returns. Accordingly, this study will examine the 
relationship of moat gradient to stock price at five- and ten-year intervals. 
 
 
Figure 1: Economic Moats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusion on Morningstar’s wide-moat roster is not tantamount to a buy recommendation.  This elite cadre of 
large-caps and mid-caps is more akin to a watch list than a buy list (Larson, 2003). Morningstar advises purchase only 
at a discount to intrinsic value.  At the present time few equities sport this kind of compelling valuation.  Morningstar 
counsels patience, reminding investors that sooner or later many of these firms will temporarily hit a rough patch. 
Investors should wait for this “fat pitch” and be poised to swing when it comes (Sellers, 2004). 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The study utilizes three basic categories compiled by Morningstar. In addition to the 154 companies that 
enjoy wide-moat status and the 764 classified as narrow-moat, Morningstar’s coverage set includes 659 companies 
that lack a moat. While by no means equivalent to the total universe of no-moat stocks, this group can serve as a proxy 
for the behavior of these supposedly suboptimal stocks. The composition of these various lists has remained relatively 
stable since inception (Larson, 2004). The prime endpoint of the study was to determine relative price appreciation of 
these moat and no-moat companies. Thomson Baseline provided and aggregated all data used in the study. This 
subscription-based diagnostic service has fundamental and pricing history on more than 9000 publicly traded U.S. 
equities. Even though Baseline is a comprehensive service, it excluded some Morningstar equities designated as 
American Depository Receipts. The Baseline analysis also deliberately omitted any Morningstar entries without at 
least a five-year history. Since the study design encompassed Morningstar’s entire population, it could compute 
aggregate averages rather than extrapolate from significance tests of statistical samples. Findings are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
STUDY FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Results support Morningstar’s thesis. Moat status is associated with higher returns for a ten-year period but 
not for a five. Moreover, in their price trajectory, moated firms demonstrate less volatility than their no moat cohort.  
Economies of Scale 
High Switching Costs 
Intangible Assets 
Network Effect 
Low Volatility 
Economic Moat High Appreciation 
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The respective ten-year beta coefficients for the wide, narrow and no moat populations are 0.88, 0.90 and 1.19. 
 
The study design suffers from limitations inherent in categorical analysis. While end points are continuous, 
moat classifications are dichotomous. Thus the study cannot determine whether appreciation would be progressively 
enhanced by position within the wide- and narrow-moat categories. Some companies may have wider moats than 
others even though they garner the same moat rating. Would these wider ones be better investments than their less 
wide peers? While the present analysis cannot address this issue conclusively, it provides suggestive evidence.  Within 
the wide-moat category Morningstar identifies two subsets that it favors. The “Bellwether 50” is comprised of large-
caps while another group consists of 35 mid-caps. The cumulative ten-year appreciation of the Bellwether roster was 
509 percent compared to 451 percent for the entire wide-moat list. Among the subset of 35 mid-caps, the cumulative 
ten-year price appreciation was 488 percent. During this time the SPX rose 119 percent. 
 
 
Table 1: Price Appreciation By Moat Category 
 
 5 Year Change 5 Year Change 
vs. SPX 
10 Year Change 10 Year Change 
vs. SPX 
Wide Moat 
N = 144 
57 75 451 332 
Narrow Moat 
N = 666 
105 123 337 219 
No Moat 
N = 550 
80 98 294 175 
 
 
Since Morningstar’s rating system is retrospective, it could be subject to survivorship bias. A company may 
qualify for wide-moat status simply because it has done well in the past. As investors look to the future, they should 
remember that these wide moats can narrow over the very period of time when returns are expected to fructify.  
Though the ditch is unlikely to disappear, the water within may drain away. After all, the advent of gunpowder 
presaged the abolition of castles. Even with the Bellwether group, a perennial query must be “how nifty are these 50”? 
For example, take a closer look at some of the “textbook” wide-moats recurrently cited by Morningstar.  Walmart is 
hailed as the low-cost gargantuan relentlessly advancing across product categories, epitomizing the first criterion of 
moat ascendancy. Morningstar argues that optimal leadership, while obviously desired, is not required in such firms 
because they are imbued with “structural advantages.” Paraphrasing Peter Lynch, Morningstar declares that wide-
moat entities are so strong, even a monkey could be placed at the helm with no disruptive impact  (Sellers, 2003). Yet 
in terms of investor relations, Walmart has been a recipe for disaster. Allegations of a discriminatory climate and a 
duplicitous director tarnish a reputation already sullied by union strife. 
 
In terms of the second moat criterion pertaining to switching costs, even device makers are vulnerable to 
outside forces. Desirous of reining in their costs, hospitals aim to sever the cozy relationship between orthopedic 
surgeons and industry representatives. As an administrator noted, doctors will be more attracted to hospital incentives 
when they realize the implant representative in the operating room is making more than they are. As for intellectual 
property, can firms like Qualcomm assume their patents will be respected in other parts of the world?  Some emerging 
markets may seek to institute their own variant of CDMA, making it difficult for Qualcomm to enforce its patents. 
Finally, in terms of network economics, success breeds imitation. A start-up firm is even hawking a cheaper PDF as 
an alternative to Adobe Acrobat. And while eBay is hardly tottering, Morningstar’s classic example finds its trajectory 
threatened. Service complaints are rising, and competitors like Amazon are starting to strut.  Ironically, technology 
enhancement may allow independent-minded entrepreneurs to bypass eBay and conduct Internet business on their 
own. Thus even if there is opportunity to buy Morningstar stocks at deeply discounted prices, investors must examine 
why the shares have retreated and ask whether these firms are now beset with a structural disadvantage. 
 
The present study points to the historical efficacy of the Morningstar model. Yet Morningstar eschews 
endorsement of small firms and so invariably neglects the emergent secular themes to which some of these firms 
might play. While adherence to Morningstar’s wide-moat classification may continue to generate above market 
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returns, a modicum of “mad money” might nonetheless deserve a strategic place in individual portfolios. As this paper 
goes to press, Morningstar is stepping beyond the reliable record of its current lists. It is now vetting for a new 
category called “Emerging-Moat Growth Companies.” This roster will include companies whose moats may one day 
be wide and whose competitive position may one day be “unassailable” (Trigg, 2005, p. 4). If Morningstar can 
forecast performance in emergent as well as established firms, its moat typology will be a valuable tool across the 
domestic spectrum. 
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